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I.  Introduction
This  is  a very  broad assignment,  and to make  any progress I have
been forced  to chart my  own  course  with  regard  to  points  to  discuss
and ways of discussing  them. So let me begin by considering the Amer-
ican  agricultural  problem  in  three  possible  world  situations.
II.  Three  possible  world  situations  and  the  place  of  American  agriculture
in them
A.  Nuclear  war  and  world  holocaust.  Here  I  have  nothing  to  say;
I have no idea what world  needs, the state of food and agriculture,
and  so on  would  be  like in  this  situation.  I leave this  situation to
RAND  Corporation  planners.
B.  Limited,  but hot wars  of the Korean  type.  In  this  world situation:
1.  Present surplus  stocks would  turn into valuable  reserve stocks
overnight.
2.  Government  price  objectives  would  shift  from  supports  to
goals.
3.  We  would  expand  output rapidly.  Pushing production  is what
we  enjoy,  and  what  we  do well.
4.  With the return  of peace  we would  be even more overexpand-
ed  relative  to  conventional  commercial demand, than  in  the
1950's  with  more  intense  adjustment  problems  in  agriculture.
5.  Hence,  in  my  opinion,  flashing hot  wars  interspersed  with  in-
tervals  of peace mean  more and  more governmental  interven-
tion  in agriculture,  some  of it pleasant,  some  of it unpleasant.
C.  A  continued  uneasy  peace  with  war  alarms  and  power  politics,
but  no  serious  shooting.
1.  This  situation seems  to me to be a distinct probability; further,
it  is the interesting  case  as far  as  American  agriculture  is  con-
cerned,  and  it  is  the  situation with  which  I will  be  concerned
in  the  remainder  of  this  talk.
452.  The problem  for American  agriculture  in  this situation  is  how
to  live and  prosper  in  a  state of overabundance,  how  to man-
age the  growing  excess productive  capacity  of American  agri-
culture  to  advantage  at home  and  abroad.
a.  The major  outlines  of a  policy  designed  to  do this,  was  the
subject  of  my  presidential  address  at  Ithaca  and  I  will  not
give  a  complete  repeat  performance  here,  but  I  would  like
to  point  out that  such  a  policy  solution  involves  two  inte-
grated  lines  of  action.
(1)  A  long-run  program  designed  to  use  the  excess  pro-
ductive  capacity  of  American  agriculture  to  support
economic  development  in  underdeveloped  countries.
(2)  Comprehensive  supply  control  to  adjust  supplies  to
demand,  at  a  fair  price,  commodity  by  commodity,
year  after  year.
3.  The  above  policy  conclusions  rest  upon  the  following  line  of
reasoning:
a. Aggregate  farm  output  is outracing  aggregate  commercial
demand  (foreign  and  domestic).
(1)  The  annual  rate  of  increase  in  aggregate  output  ex-
ceeds  the  annual  rate  of  increase  in  demand  by  .5
percent.
(2)  This  imbalance  is  likely  to  become  worse  rather  than
better.
b. The  food  and  fiber  needs  of  the  underdeveloped  countries
are  great  and  growing.
(1)  I  estimate  the  caloric  gap  of  the  non-Communist  un-
derdeveloped  world  to be  30 to  35  million metric  tons
of  wheat  per  year.
(2)  This  gap  is  widening  rather  than  narrowing.
c.  Food  and  fiber  can  be  used  to  finance  development-to
support  capital  formation  and  increase  worker  produc-
tivity.
(1)  In  the  main,  present  surplus  disposal  is  not  inducing
development.
(2)  We  are  simply  getting  rid  of our  surplus  stocks.
(3)  But with  some  substantial  but not impossible  revisions
in  our  surplus  disposal  policy  we  could  make  an  im-
46portant  contribution  to  economic  development  in
these  countries.
d. But an effective  linkage  of foreign  needs  to our excess  pro-
ductive capacity does not solve the American farm problem.
(1)  It temporarily  moderates  the  pressure  of  supplies  on
demand.
(2)  But the  present  heavy pressure  of supplies  on demand
can  be  expected  to  rebuild  again  within  a  few  years.
e. Thus,  any  permanent solution  to  the American  farm  prob-
lem  demands  effective,  comprehensive  supply  control-
commodity  by  commodity,  year  after year.
4.  In  the remainder  of this  paper  I want to consider  certain  for-
eign developments  and their interaction  with the above lines of
action  in  the  context  of  continued  but  uneasy  world  peace.
III. A  thesis  concerning  economic  development  prospects  in  underdeveloped
areas
A.  Emerging  in  several  places  is  a  thesis,  to  which  I  subscribe,  that
Communists  have  a distinct  advantage  over  us  in  promoting eco-
nomic  development  in underdeveloped  countries.  The thesis1 runs
as  follows:
1.  The  underdeveloped  peoples  aspire  with  a  consuming  desire
to develop  themselves  in  20 years-not  200.  (This  is the crux
of  the  matter.)
2.  The  Communists  tell them  that if you follow  us you can  do it
-and  they point to the U.S.S.R.  and  now China.
3.  So  a  country  with  no  tradition  or  experience  with  Western
democracy  and great poverty takes  the Communist route com-
plete  with central planning,  state  police,  and propaganda  ma-
chine.  The  central  Communist  party  with  its  rigid  doctrine,
drive,  and  police  force  substitutes  for tradition  in  controlling
and directing the lives of the toiling masses. No loss of freedom
is  experienced  since  none existed in the first place-except  for
the  few very  rich whose  heads  roll  in the  substitution  process.
4.  In  this  context  capital  is  rung  out  of  the  hides  of  the  people
whatever  the  cost in human lives  and suffering-but  capital  is
formed  and  productivity  is  increased.
1Conrad  Hammar,  who  spent  a  decade  in  various  overseas  programs  following
World  War  II,  is  now writing  up  this  thesis;  it is  touched upon in the many  writings  of
Hans  Morgenthau,  the  famous  University of  Chicago  political theorist;  and  it is  stated
forcefully  in  the  article  by  Zbigniew  Brzezinski  entitled  "The  Politics of  Underdevelop-
ment,"  World Politics, Vol.  9, October  1956.
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tive  will  not  take  it-in  schools,  roads,  canals,  irrigation
projects,  etc.-and  where  it must go  in great  amounts  to  sup-
port rapid industrialization  in  backward  countries.
6.  After the  cost  has  been  paid  for and  buried,  in  human suffer-
ings,  the  Communists  can  then  point  to  another  "success"-
a  developed  economy.  Central  planning,  continuous  propa-
ganda,  and  a  police  state  permit  a  Communist  government  to
do  what  a  democratic  government  cannot  do-form  capital
rapidly at the expense  of human dignity and human  lives.  This
is  the  Communist  advantage  in  underdeveloped  countries.
B.  Let me point  out that  all  eyes are  going  to be  on China and India
in the  1960's-comparing  the  development  of those two countries.
1.  If India  falls way  behind  China in the  development  race,  then
we can say  good-bye to  India.
2.  And  when  India  goes-so  does  all  the  underdeveloped  world
in Asia  and  Africa.
C.  Thus,  I  argue  that we must in  our national  self-interest,  whatever
the  cost,  transfer huge  amounts  of capital  to  India  and other  key
underdeveloped  countries  (e.g.,  Egypt,  Turkey)  and  help  them
transform that capital  into going productive economies-help  them
make  the leap  from  underdeveloped  areas  to developed  areas  in  a
few  decades.  This help  must take many  forms.2
1.  Technical  know-how  (economic,  administrative,  production
practices).
2.  Raw  materials.
3.  Machines  and  equipment.
4.  Food.
D.  Now all  of these avenues  of assistance  are  important,  and all must
be  traveled  in  mass,  but let  me  concentrate  on  the  last,  namely
food.
1.  We have surplus  capacity in food production,  which is  a prob-
lem  to  us,  and  we  have  the  opportunity  here  to  use  it wisely
and constructively  if we will  (i.e.,  to  induce  and  support eco-
nomic  development).
2.  We  have  the  knowledge  to  use  this  surplus  food  producing
capacity  wisely  and  constructively.
'For a directly opposing view see the article  by Milton Friedman,  "Foreign Economic
Aid:  Means  and  Objectives,"  The  Yale  Review,  Vol.  37,  June  1958.
483.  Thus, I make this plea to all agricultural economists,  extension
and research  workers  alike,  that  they  go  all out and  convince
the relevant  groups in American  life of:
a. The need to  make a major contribution  to the development
of  the underdeveloped  countries.
b. The  important  role  that food  can  play  in  the development
process.
4.  Extension  economists  can  do this by developing  strong educa-
tional programs  on  this  foreign  problem.
IV.  Problems  and  potentialities of  American  agriculture vis-a-vis  developed
economies  and  competing  export  nations
A.  If  we  continue  to  provide  the  agricultural  sector  in  the  United
States  with  price  and  income  support,  as  I  am  sure  that  we  will
and  as  most every country  does  to  some  degree,  then  it is  almost
certain  that  our domestic  farm  prices will  be above  those of most
other  export countries  and that we  will have  difficulty  selling  our
farm products  abroad.
1.  In this  real  world  context  there  is  much pressure in  Congress,
representing  specific  commodity  groups,  to  sell  our products
abroad  competitively  for  dollars  for  whatever  it  will  bring,
and  make  up  the  difference  out  of  the  treasury-in  short  to
engage in old fashioned dumping.
2.  But  this,  of  course,  is  where  we  run  into  trouble  with  our
Western  friends  and  neighbors  who  have  less  well  fixed  na-
tional  treasuries.
B.  The  problem  here  is-how  do  you  sell  on  the  commercial  world
market from a base of a planned and income-supported  agriculture
when you also happen to be the richest country  in the world?
1.  Third parties  do not worry too much about  this problem when
the exporting country  in question happens to be New Zealand,
or the  Netherlands,  both  of which  have  government  stabiliza-
tion programs  of one kind or another for agriculture,  but also
have limited public treasuries.
2.  An answer often given to this problem by persons  not engaged
in farming  is  to  pull  the  price-income  support  rug  out from
under agriculture  and let it operate  in a free market.
a. But,  as most of you recognize,  I do not consider  this to be  a
wise policy for many reasons.
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petitors  would hate very much to see us "jerk the rug."
c.  They  just  don't  want  us  to  use  our  public  treasury  to  run
them out  of business.
3.  The  solution that I would suggest  in this context  is a  system of
International  Committee  Agreements.
a.  Formulated multilaterally  with both  import  and  export na-
tions represented  in the agreements.
b. Where an  agreement price is arrived  at through compromise
and  "horse-trading"  around  the agreement  table.
c.  Where  both  import and export  nations agree  to take and to
ship specific  quantities  over given periods.
4.  This  is  not  an  ideal  solution,  for  the  strongest national power
(probably  the  U.  S. in  most  instances)  could  and  would  still
throw  its weight  around  and adversely  influence  the  economic
position  of lesser powers.
a. But  at  least  all  could  see  what was  going  on,  and  various
alignments  of  power  could  be  pitted  against  the  strongest
country in the bargaining  process.
b.  In  other  words,  the  International  Commodity  Agreement
provides  one kind  of  a  multilateral  trading  arena  in  which
the  various  national  interests  may  be  advanced  and  coun-
tered  in arriving  at a  sort of equilibrium price  and quantity
solution.
C.  In sum,  given state intervention  in  foreign trade in most countries,
governmental  intervention  in agriculture in our country and almost
every  other export country,  and unequal national powers  (in terms
of military might and  public treasury),  I don't  see any reasonable
alternative  to  multilateral  International  Commodity  Agreements
for the commercial segment  of agricultural exports.
1.  And  we  should  be  taking  the  lead  in  their  formulation  and
development  rather  than  talking  piously  about  a  free  world
market while  we are looking  for a place  to dump  on the world
commercial  market.
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